The widespread use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies have been extensively deployed in the ubiquitous domain, such as luggage box tracing, supply chain system and health care medical system [1] [2] [3] . Low-cost RFID tags in supply chain system will be better choices for the shopkeepers and manufacturers that currently pay close attention to increase the efficiency of the identification compared with barcode technology. RFID tag technology can apply to different kinds of products that desire researchers to design how to implement the real-world functions. Moreover, this efficient technology can guarantee that the tag identificates automatically the legitimate product.
Despite those advantages, the security and the privacy of the tag owner are the main concern in the rapid and widespread application of this distinguished technology. The existing ownership transfer protocols for supply chain system have respective advantages. Among them, the security and the privacy of the entities (tag and owner) have played the important role. However, the later security analysis carried out on many schemes [4] [5] [6] have showed obvious weaknesses. This has motivated researchers improve the vulnerable schemes in order to protect against various attacks. For example, the key disclosure attack in protocol is an attack that the current messages of the tag and monitored and the current and next run's keys should be revealed by an attacker. Besides, forward and backward untraceable is introduced in [7] , where the attacker run the current protocol and obtain the future and the past secret keys of the target tag.
When an attacker knows the related keys of the target tag, s/he is able to trace its location. It is necessary for researcher to present RFID ownership transfer protocol, to amend the weaknesses and enhance its security level, analyze the security of the improved scheme in security model.
The main goal of this paper is to point out the weaknesses of two protocols [8, 14] which are liable to tracing attack and forward untraceable attack. Then, we modify one protocol and achieve secure ownership transfer in the further. We demonstrate that the modified version meets backward untraceability against the new owner and forward untraceability against the old owner. Moreover, we also show that our protocol provides forward and backward untraceability using the formal model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the related work and adversary model are introduced, respectively. Section 3 and 4 analyses the weaknesses in Doss et al.'s scheme [14] and Karda's et al.'s protocol, respectively. In Section 5, our enhanced protocol based on Karda's et al.'s protocol and safety analysis of the scheme is showed in detail. In Section 6, we propose the conclusion.
Preliminaries
For simplicity, the notations used through the paper are defined in Table 1 . 
Shared secrets between T and R. r,n
The keys in the tag.
TID;h(TID)
The identifier of tag; The hash value of identifier.
In this paper, we adopt the oracles in the Vaudenay model [9] . The following definitions and oracles are used to analyze security property of the RFID protocol.
• CreateTag x (ID) creates the free tag with ID using SetupTag(ID i ).
• DrawTag() stochastically selects a tag from the free tags to the drawn tags as vtag.
• Free(vtag) gets back the tag vtag to the set of free tags.
• Launch() →π activates a new protocol π.
• SendReader-Tag (m R ,π) →m' R . The R i sends m R from R i to tag and obtains the response m' R .
• SendTag (m, vtag) →m'. The tag vtag transmits the message m and responds with m'.
• Result(π) returns 1 when protocol instance π is successfully executed or 0 otherwise.
• Corrupt(vtag) →keys. The adversary knows the secrets of the tag vtag. This paper mainly introduces two types of attacker ability: narrow-strong attacker and weak attacker. To be special, the former is in the forward and backward untraceable analysis, and the latter is in tracing attack analysis. 
Cryptanalysis of Doss et al.'s Protocol
We introduce Doss et al.'s protocol in Figure. 1. The collaborative authentication phase is as follows:
Step 1. Reader to Tag The reader sends the messages ( hello, s ) to the tag.
Step 2. Tag to Reader The tag calculates x = h(TID)⊕r⊕s⊕t. The tag also computes x'=x 2 mod n;
2 mod n. The tag forwards (x'', t'') to the reader. In order to simplify the analysis steps, the steps 3-6 in Figure 1 are omitted here. The tracing attack in Doss et al.'s protocol has three phases.
1) The testing phase:
The attacker chooses the target tag T*, and sets s=0. Then, s/he sends ( hello, 0 ) to T*, and monitors the outputs (*x'', *t''). We can obtain the following equation (*x'' ⊕ *t'')=( h(TID) ⊕r) 4 mod n. Therefore, the computed value (*x''⊕*t'') should be fixed owing to the fixed keys h(TID), r and n for T*. 3) The decision phase:
The attacker computes the XORed value ( 
Cryptanalysis of Kardaş et al.'s Protocol
We give a detail process of Kardaş et al.'s protocol as follows:
1) The initialization phase:
The registrar stores three keys (K, S, L). It also computes val 1 
, h(K)) in the DB and arranges (K, L, val 2 , state) to the tag and (K, S, val 1 ) to the reader, respectively.
2) The authentication phase: The steps are described below in Figure2.
Step 1. R i cteates a random number N a and calculates r 1 = h (N a ). Then it sends r 1 to the T i .
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Step 3. The R i transmits N a , r 1 , r 2 , M 1 , and γ to DB.
Step However, when there is no match, in order to prevent the adversary to verify M 1 for r 1 and r 2 , the DB generates the nonce M 2 and sends it to the R i .
Step 5. R i forwards M 2 to the T i . Upon receiving M 2 , T i computes h (M 2 ⊕v 2 ) and checks whether it is equal to val 2 . If equal, then it updates K = v 2 , L = N b , and val 2 = r 1 .
Karda¸set al.'s proposed an efficient and private RFID authentication protocol supporting ownership transfer (see Figure. 2). They claimed that their protocol have achieved forward and backward untraceable security. However, we point out their scheme suffers from forward untraceable attack and key exposure attack. Then, we show the attacks in detail.
The leakage of the tag's keys totally threatens the RFID system. In particular, the adversary can monitor, store and modify the transmitted messages. Alternatively, the adversary can counterfeit the messages of the tag. We introduce two attacks on the protocol as follows:
Tracing Attack on Karda¸s et al.'s Protocol Under the Weak Attacker
Since r 1 , r 2 and N a are sent in the open, an adversary (the malicious old owner) can trace the future states of T i that tag's key val 2 = r 1 which is owned by the new owner. Meanwhile, the (i+1) th keys {val 1 , S} stored in DB are revealed by reason that the keys {val 1 , S} depended on {r 2 , N a } respectively in the key-update mechanism. 
Forward Traceability Attack on Protocol under the Strong Attacker

The Improvement of Kapoor et al.'s Protocol
In this section, we present a authentication scheme which is the improved version of the protocol proposed in [8] . In our protocol, we achieve the forward untraceable and backward untraceable property whereas computational expense and Communication cost is low in the system. Then, the initialization and the authentication phases are same as the original protocol. The enhanced protocol is summarized in Figure 3 .
Soon afterwards, we modify Karda¸s et al.'s protocol to make the enhanced protocol against the attacks described in the previous section. To improve the security of the protocol, we assume that all tags and DB are equipped with new update mechanism. The DB updates the keys K = v 1 ⊕r 2 , S = N a ⊕v 2 , and val 1 = r 2 ⊕v 2 , while the tag renews the secrets K = v 1 ⊕r 2 , L = N b ⊕v 2 , and val 2 = r 1 ⊕v 2 .
The Formal Privacy Proof
In the paper, we provide untraceable security analysis in Vaudenay's model with a strong attacker.
Theorem 1 The improved protocol is forward untraceable.
Moreover, in order to meet forward untraceable, the encrypted value v 2 should be encrypted in the key-update mechanism. After a scheme successfully runs i th round，the updated secrets of T i as follows.
i+1 K 
The queries is finished, acknowledges receipt of τ(vtag')= ID x . 
+ is trivial and {Adv BUpriv A (k)}=0＜＜ε. We demonstrate that our protocol meets forward and backward untraceable in the Vaudenay's model. Next, we show that our scheme provides security properties.
Security Analysis
1)
Resistance against secret parameters disclosure and replay attack Since the random number r 1 are sent in plain text, the attacker is not able to reveal the current key of the tag and can calculate the updated key using the public information and the known functional structure of the tag. Nevertheless, the revised protocol resolves the questions by enhancing the key-update mechanism. Even if the attacker monitors the i th messages, s/he cannot calculate the keys of the target tag.
2) Resistance against tag impersonation attack In order to impersonate the legitimate tag, the attacker should create a valid M 1 in our protocol. For the case where state = 0, the attacker cannot produce a valid v 1 because the nonce r 2 and γ=h(K) are generated by the tag and the attacker can guess it with a negligible probability. For the case where state = 1, the random numbers r 2 and r≠h(K) are suggested by the tag and the attacker is able to calculate M 1 and γ with a negligible probability.
Nevertheless, the attacker can intercept the data from the reader to the DB (the tag) and relay them later when the tag keys always remain old, tag impersonate attack fails.
3) Resistance against DoS attack
Since the DB preserves the old and new keys, does not de-synchronize the tag and the reader in the next run. Hence, to de-synchronize a specific tag, the adversary can modify the interactive messages between the reader and the tag such that the tag successfully authenticates the reader with a negligible probability. 4) Resistance against traceability attack If the attacker replays r 1 , obtains the different messages r 2 , M 1 and γ from the target tag, and cannot trace T i . Since each session of the protocol is randomized by the reader and the tag, it is not possible to trace the tag by analyzing the sent messages. Eventually, the improved scheme is forward untraceable and backward untraceable in this section.
The Comparisons of Security Properties
It can be seen from Table 2 that the improved protocol meets all security requirements compared with other schemes. 
Conclusions
Recently, the schemes [8, 14] have security issue. Although their protocol designers have claimed the optimal security for the protocol, our security analysis demonstrates that these protocols have serious disadvantage. Finally, we present a new ownership transfer protocol based on [8] , which meets security requirements, such as tag impersonation resistance, DoS attack resistance, forward untraceable, backward untraceable, secret disclosure and replay attack resistance.
